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PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION: BALANCING
THE STUDENTS AND THE BOTTOM LINE
INTRODUCTION
“A nonprofit raises money to finance its mission. A for-profit has a mission
in order to make money.” 1 These two structures seem theoretically incompatible,
but the deal between the public Purdue University and for-profit Kaplan
University is testing this theory by creating a new entity, Purdue University
Global. 2 Purdue University Global, also called Purdue Global, operates as an
online education arm of Purdue University. This deal is being called the first of
its kind and has the potential to set a new precedent in higher education 3
Depending on who is asked, the deal between Kaplan, Inc. and Purdue
University is either an innovative solution, or a disturbing marriage. 4 Bob
Shireman was an Education Department official during the Obama
administration and described the deal as an “existential threat to public
education.” 5
While it is commonplace now for non-profit public and private universities
to contract with private companies, these deals create online courses which are
still under the existing university name, governance, and structure. 6 That is not
the case with Purdue Global. The creation of Purdue Global is unprecedented. It
is the first time a for-profit university corporation has become a part of a public
system of higher education. 7 This is a move that has deeply worried some Purdue
faculty members; over 300 members created a petition opposing the deal. 8 Their
1
Robert Shireman, These Colleges Say They’re Nonprofit – But Are They?, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION
(Aug. 23, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/colleges-say-theyre-nonprofit/.
2
Paul Fain & Rick Seltzer, Purdue’s Bold Move, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/04/28/purdue-acquires-kaplan-university-create-new-publiconline-university-under-purdue.
3
Paul Fain, Fine Print and Tough Questions for the Purdue-Kaplan Deal, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 30,
2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/05/30/regulators-and-accreditor-begin-review-purduesboundary-testing-deal-kaplan.
4
Fain, supra note 3.
5
Id.
6
Derek Newton, How Companies Profit Off Education at Nonprofit Schools, THE ATLANTIC (June 7,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/06/for-profit-companies-nonprofit-colleges/
485930/.
7
Kevin Kinser, Purdue-Kaplan deal blurs lines between for-profit and public colleges, THE
CONVERSATION (Mar 7, 2018), http://theconversation.com/purdue-kaplan-deal-blurs-lines-between-for-profitand-public-colleges-92642.
8
Dave Bangert, Purdue-Kaplan: 300+ faculty petition against NewU deal, say it will hurt Purdue’s
name, JOURNAL & COURIER (Nov. 2, 2017, 2:33 PM), https://www.jconline.com/story/news/local/purdue/2017/
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concerns largely revolve around the quality of education that Purdue Global will
offer. 9
This comment will outline the history of Kaplan, Inc. and Purdue University
separately in order to understand their positions before the deal. Second, the deal
is explained by detailing how it was set up, the terms, the structure, and how this
agreement is different. Next, this comment outlines how this deal is beneficial
to both Purdue University and Kaplan, Inc.. After explaining the arrangement
and its benefits, this essay explores whether this deal creates issues, and if those
issues are due to its corporate form or its substance. Next, the future of for-profit
schools and the future of Purdue Global are discussed, followed by conclusions.
It is the opinion of this comment that the transaction between Purdue
University and Kaplan, Inc. has created an entity with neither the regulation of
a private company nor the protections and transparency of a public institution.
This give and take between Purdue University and Kaplan, Inc. to reach a deal
has resulted in Purdue Global being a diluted version of both a public school and
private company.

I.

HISTORY OF KAPLAN, INC. AND PURDUE UNIVERSITY

It is important to understand the history of Kaplan, Inc. and Purdue
University because their past provide context surrounding the choice to create
Purdue Global.
Kaplan, Inc. has been an education services provider for over 80 years. 10
Kaplan began as a tutoring business which grew to over 100 centers in the U.S.
by 1984. 11 In this same year, Kaplan is acquired by The Washington Post
Company. 12 In 2000 Kaplan, Inc. enters the realm of higher education by
acquiring a network of publicly-traded for-profit career colleges and Kaplan
currently describes its higher education branch as its “biggest business.” 13
Kaplan’s entrance into the realm of for-profit education closely coincides with
the general trend in the U.S. for a higher demand in for-profit schooling.
In the early 1990’s for-profit schools were proving themselves as extremely

11/02/purdue-kaplan-300-faculty-petition-against-newu-deal-say-hurt-purdues-name/825039001/.
9
Id.
10
About Us, Kᴀᴘʟᴀɴ, https://kaplan.com/about-us-overview/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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lucrative businesses and the industry boom began. 14 Between 1990 and 2010,
the number of bachelor’s degrees coming from for-profit schools increased
sevenfold. 15 However, by 2010 these for-profit schools, including Kaplan
University, garnered attention by regulators and the media for questionable
practices. 16 In 2012, the United States Senate Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee released a report regarding poor practices by for-profit
schools including Kaplan University. 17
Before the publication of this Senate report detailing Kaplan’s performance,
Kaplan was owned by The Washington Post Company and in 2013 Donald
Graham, chairman of Graham Holdings Company, sold The Washington Post
but retained Kaplan, Inc. in Graham Holdings. Kaplan is still a subsidiary of
Graham Holdings today. 18
Purdue University was created in 1869 as a public land grant university. 19 A
land grant university is a school created pursuant to the Morrill Land Grant Act
which states that the federal government will turn over land to any state that
agrees to use the land sale proceeds to create a college teaching agriculture and
the “mechanic arts,” otherwise known as STEM. 20 In 1930 the Purdue Research
Foundation was created, which still operates to manage Purdue University’s
intellectual property, accept gifts, administer trusts, acquire property, and
negotiate research contracts. 21 The university’s agriculture and STEM programs
continue to be recognized as some of the best in the country. 22
Purdue University and Kaplan, Inc. became a part of each other’s history
when the two institutions formed Purdue University Global in 2017. 23

14
James Surowiecki, The Rise and Fall of For-Profit Schools, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/11/02/the-rise-and-fall-of-for-profit-schools.
15
Id.
16
Majority Staff of S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 112th Cong., For Profit Higher
Education: The Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment and Ensure Student Success 19 (Comm. Print 2012),
available at https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI.pdf.
17
Id.
18
Robert Shireman, There’s a Reason the Purdue-Kaplan Deal Sounds Too Good to Be True, THE
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/There-s-a-Reasonthe/239954.
19
Purdue History, https://www.purdue.edu/purdue/about/history.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Purdue ranked 5th best public university in U.S., Pᴜʀᴅᴜᴇ Uɴɪᴠᴇʀsɪᴛʏ (Sep. 27, 2017), https://www.
purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2017/Q3/purdue-ranked-5th-best-public-university-in-u.s..html; see Top 10
Research News Stories from Purdue, Pᴜʀᴅᴜᴇ Uɴɪᴠᴇʀsɪᴛʏ (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.purdue.edu/
newsroom/releases/2018/Q4/2018s-top-10-research-news-stories-from-purdue.html.
23
Emma Kerr, Purdue Gets Final Approval to Buy For-Profit Kaplan, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
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II.

THE ACQUISITION OF KAPLAN UNIVERSITY

A. Setting Up the Deal
In April 2017, Purdue University announced that it was planning to acquire
Kaplan University. 24 Purdue had been in private negotiations for months
regarding the acquisition of Kaplan University from Graham Holdings. 25 Mitch
Daniels, the president of Purdue University and former Governor of Indiana, has
been the vocal leader of this deal. 26 Daniels has been clear that he believes this
deal to create Purdue Global expands the mission of Purdue as a land-grant
university to provide access to education for as many people as possible. 27 Since
the announcement of the deal, information has been inconsistent and released
piecemeal as the deal has been moving forward. This paper will clarify the
transaction between Kaplan and Purdue University as well as explain the
corporate structures created as a result of the transaction.
First, it is important to understand Kaplan, Inc.’s ownership prior to the
acquisition. Kaplan, Inc. is a subsidiary of Graham Holdings Company. 28
Kaplan Inc.’s operations are divided into three segments: Kaplan Higher
Education, Kaplan Test Prep, and Kaplan International. 29 Under the Kaplan
Higher Education section is Kaplan University, and the for-profit corporation
Kaplan University is what Purdue aimed to acquire in this deal.
Before the deal could be finalized, this acquisition required the approval of
three major institutions: The Department of Education, The Indiana Commission
for Higher Education, and the Higher Learning Commission. 30 The Indiana
Commission was the first to grant approval by a unanimous vote in August
2017. 31 The Department of Education granted initial approval in September
2017, but the approval included stipulations. 32 Not all the details of the

EDUCATION (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Purdue-Gets-Final-Approval-to/242747.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Education, GRAHAM HOLDINGS, http://www.ghco.com/education (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
29
Id.
30
U.S. Department of Education acts on Purdue NewU plan to acquire Kaplan, Pᴜʀᴅᴜᴇ Uɴɪᴠᴇʀsɪᴛʏ (Sep.
19, 2017), https://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2017/Q3/u.s.-department-of-education-acts-on-purduenewu-plan-to-acquire-kaplan,-operate-as-indianas-newest-public-institution.html.
31
Id.
32
Paul Fain, Education Dept. Confirms Initial Approval of Kaplan, EDMC Deals, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Sep. 20, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/09/20/education-dept-confirms-initialapproval-kaplan-edmc-deals.

MILLS_7.25.19

2019]

7/25/2019 11:42 AM

PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

1095

Department’s stipulations to Purdue have been made available, but one was that
the new university must include the name “Purdue.” 33 Finally, this acquisition
required the ultimate approval of change of control granted by the Higher
Learning Commission (HLC), which is the regional accreditor for Purdue
University and Kaplan University. 34 This approval for change of control was
granted on February 22, 2018 and stated that Purdue Global will be a separately
accredited institution from Purdue University. 35 Upon these approvals, Purdue
officially acquired Kaplan University on March 22, 2018, which completed the
transaction with Kaplan Higher Education. 36
B. Terms of the Deal
For the purchase price of $1, Purdue acquired Kaplan University’s assets and
operations, which includes 14 campuses and learning centers, 30,000 current
students, and approximately 2,100 employees. 37 Kaplan, Inc. will continue to
provide Purdue Global with back-office services including technology,
marketing, admissions, and financial aid. 38 In addition to these services, some
of which are common between private companies and non-profit institutions,
there are more requirements on the private company which are not ‘back-office’
services. 39 These include editorial services, advertising, front-end student
advising, international student recruitment, test preparation, business offices,
human resources, facilities and property management, and general
administrative functions. 40
Purdue signed on to a 30-year agreement with Kaplan, Inc. for providing
services to Purdue Global. 41 Purdue will compensate Kaplan, Inc. for its services
33
Kaplan to become Purdue University Global, Tʜᴇ Cᴏᴜʀɪᴇʀ (Jan. 13, 2018), https://wcfcourier.com/
news/local/education/kaplan-to-become-purdue-university-global/article_7e770cac-ae1a-5873-b964-4f18bc
820a8b.html; U.S. Department of Education acts on Purdue NewU plan to acquire Kaplan, supra, note 30.
34
U.S. Department of Education acts on Purdue NewU plan to acquire Kaplan, supra note 30.
35
Public Statement from Higher Learning Commission on Approval of Change of Control by Purdue
University and Kaplan University (Mar. 5, 2018) available at https://www.hlcommission.org/download/
_PublicStatements/Purdue-Kaplan%20Public%20Statement%203-2018.pdf.
36
Transaction Complete for Purdue Global, Pᴜʀᴅᴜᴇ Uɴɪᴠᴇʀsɪᴛʏ (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.purdue.edu/purduemoves/initiatives/online/story-purdue-global.php.
37
Id.
38
Goldie Blumenstyk, Purdue’s Purchase of Kaplan Is a Big Bet – and a Sign of the Times, THE
CHRONICLE (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Purdue-s-Purchase-of-Kaplan/239931?cid=
rclink.
39
Shireman, supra note 18.
40
Id.
41
Rick Seltzer, Pushing Public Higher Ed Boundaries, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 4, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/05/04/purdues-deal-kaplan-packs-low-front-costs-long-terms-andboundary-pushing-details.
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by paying Kaplan 12.5 percent of Purdue Global yearly revenue; however,
Kaplan, Inc. will only be paid this percentage after Purdue and Kaplan have
recuperated their direct costs. 42
For the first five years of this 30-year agreement, Kaplan, Inc. will pay
Purdue a “priority payment” of $10 million annually beyond its operating costs
before Kaplan can be repaid for its revenue percentage or direct costs. 43 As
summarized by Rick Seltzer, “Kaplan anticipates receiving payment for services
provided plus a share of revenue. It is also, however, guaranteeing that Purdue’s
new university will generate at least $10 million per year in new revenue for five
years.” 44
This deal contains an option which states that after six years, Purdue has the
option to buy out Kaplan and its operations of Purdue Global, or Purdue may
contract with another online program management company. 45 If Purdue
chooses either of these options, it must pay a fee of 125 percent of Purdue
Global’s total revenue from the previous year. 46 This termination fee to be paid
by Purdue Global would be in the form of debt, 10-year senior notes, and Purdue
Global would also have the opportunity to receive some of Kaplan’s support
services assets at no extra cost. 47
C. Structure of the Deal: Creating Purdue University Global
Purdue University Global is a non-profit corporation incorporated in
Indiana. 48 On the Purdue Global website under “ownership,” it states:
Purdue University Global, Inc., is an Indiana public benefit
corporation controlled by its sole member, The Trustees of Purdue
University, a statutory body corporate that manages and conducts
Purdue University, the State of Indiana’s land-grant university. Purdue
Global operates as a public postsecondary state educational institution
affiliate pursuant to IC 21-7-13-26.5(a). 49

Purdue Global will have its own board of trustees separate from Purdue
42

Blumenstyk, supra note 38.
Seltzer, supra note 41.
44
Id.
45
Blumenstyk, supra note 38.
46
Seltzer, supra note 41.
47
Id.
48
Bylaws of Purdue University Global, Inc., PURDUE GLOBAL, https://www.purdue.edu/purduemoves/
initiatives/online/story-purdue-global.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
49
Ownership, Pᴜʀᴅᴜᴇ Global Uɴɪᴠᴇʀsɪᴛʏ, https://catalog.purdueglobal.edu/contact-information/
ownership/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
43
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University, and the new board will be selected by Purdue. 50 Betty Vandenbosch,
former president of Kaplan University, has been selected as the first Purdue
Global Chancellor. 51 The Chancellor reports to the Purdue University president
and Purdue Global’s six person board of trustees. 52 This six member board will
be comprised of five Purdue University trustees and one “external” trustee, as
described in a Purdue University press release. 53 In an interview, Donald
Graham stated that the sixth member of the board will be a trustee from Kaplan
University. 54 Purdue Global will be entirely funded by tuition and donations; it
will not be receiving funds from the state of Indiana. 55
Purdue Global will be exempt from some open records laws to which other
Indiana public universities and public universities around the country are
subject. 56 This exemption was created by the state legislature. 57 It inserted
language into the state’s budget stating that Indiana public benefit corporations
will not be subject to open records requirements. 58 It was scheduled to be signed
into law the same week Purdue announced its plan to acquire Kaplan. 59 Journal
& Courier reports Purdue was instrumental in crafting the legislation and “put it
in the hands of legislators.” 60 Upon reviewing the six bill versions, the 39
proposed Senate amendments, 20 proposed House amendments, and committee
reports, there is absolutely no mention of the addition of section 142, defining
postsecondary SEI affiliated educational institutions. 61 The first mention of
section 142 that allows Purdue Global to operate as a non-profit public school is
in the final version that was passed.
The exemptions for public benefit corporations cover “open door laws,
50
Kevin Kinser, Purdue-Kaplan deal blurs lines between for-profit and public colleges, The
Conversation (Mar. 7, 2018), http://theconversation.com/purdue-kaplan-deal-blurs-lines-between-for-profitand-public-colleges-92642.
51
Bylaws of Purdue University Global, Inc., supra note 48.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Jeffrey R. Young, Why Donald Graham Sold Kaplan University to Purdue for $1, EDSURGE (May 16,
2017), https://www.edsurge.com/news/2017-05-16-why-donald-graham-sold-kaplan-university-to-purdue-for1.
55
Seltzer, supra note 41.
56
Paul Fain, Purdue Global’s Arrival, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.
com/news/2018/03/07/accreditor-backs-purdue-university-global-more-profits-seek-convert-or-sell.
57
Dave Bangert, Law shields Purdue’s new online school, JOURNAL & COURIER (May 2, 2017, 4:43 PM),
https://www.jconline.com/story/opinion/columnists/dave-bangert/2017/05/02/bangert-law-shields-purduesnew-online-school/101183110/.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 21-7-13-26.5 (2019).
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access to public records laws and accounting for public funds codes – each on
the books to offer basic public scrutiny that governs the state’s governmental
bodies and universities, including Purdue (University).” 62 Purdue’s legal
counsel Steve Schultz says this measure was taken because Purdue Global will
operate like a nonprofit corporation and will not “meet the definition of a public
agency” under state laws on open records and meetings. 63
The terms of the agreement were at one time available on Graham Holdings’
website, and were distributed in other ways, but it is practically impossible now
to find all of the official terms of the Purdue-Kaplan agreement online. This is
likely because Purdue Global is exempt from open records laws. 64 Because
Purdue Global is exempt from open records laws, all records of the transaction
kept by Purdue Global as opposed to Purdue University will be unreachable to
the public. 65 Purdue stated it would not release the full agreement because “most
of the appendices to the agreements governing the transaction, which is itself a
unique and novel concept, contain trade secret information…Purdue is not
allowed to disclose that information under Indiana’s Access to Public Records
Act.” 66
D. How This Is Different from Traditional Online Program Management Deal
The role of Kaplan Higher Education after this acquisition will be similar to
an online program management (OPM) company, a familiar deal in higher
education; however, this is an OPM deal “on steroids.” 67
OPM companies originated by creating online programs for public and
private non-profit colleges and universities around twenty years ago when
schools were “ill-equipped and unprepared” to create such programming. 68
These eager tech companies took a school’s existing course content and adapted
it to online courses, and in exchange for creating the content and marketing the
program, the school paid the OPM company a percentage of tuition generated
from the new programs. 69 Little has changed in this model over the past twenty

62

IND. CODE ANN. § 21-7-13-26.5. (LexisNexis 2016).
Id.
64
Fain, supra note 3.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Shireman, supra note 18.
68
Derek Newton, How Companies Profit Off Education at Nonprofit Schools, The Atlantic (Jun. 7, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/06/for-profit-companies-nonprofit-colleges/485930/.
69
Id.
63
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years, as tuition sharing is still common practice. 70 In 2019, up to 80 percent of
the 2,600 (and growing) colleges offering online education outsource the
management of these programs, and most of these colleges pay for the services
by tuition sharing. 71 This background of traditional OPM agreements should
help serve as a frame of reference to analyze the differences between these deals
and the Purdue Global deal.
Robert Shireman and Margaret Mattes at the Century Foundation analyzed
hundreds of OPM contracts from 76 public universities, and found that none of
the 76 contracts grant the for-profit entity the breadth of rights that Purdue
University grants Kaplan Higher Education. 72 While common OPMs agree to
create the platform and market the program, Kaplan agrees to much more as
previously mentioned, such as student advising, admissions support services,
human resources, technology support, and facilities and property management. 73
A benefit for Kaplan, Inc. that goes far beyond the normal OPM contractor is
that the Purdue Global budget must be approved by Kaplan, Inc., and Kaplan,
Inc. has veto power over the budget. 74 These terms of the Purdue-Kaplan
agreement are currently only available through second-hand publications
because the link to the agreement on Graham Holdings website now says “page
not found.” 75
III. THE BENEFITS OF PURDUE GLOBAL FOR KAPLAN, INC. AND
PURDUE UNIVERSITY
This deal between Kaplan, Inc. and Purdue University allowed both parties
to gain something they could not have otherwise obtained through a traditional
online program management agreement. Kaplan, Inc. and Purdue University
were each facing their own struggles and this acquisition gave each party just
what they needed.
A. Benefit for Purdue
While there has been speculation and accusation as to Purdue’s motives for
doing this deal, Mitch Daniels addressed his reasoning in his annual open letter
70

Id.
Id.
72
Robert Shireman, supra note 18.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
GRAHAM HOLDINGS, http://www.ghco.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=62487&p=irol-SECText&TEXT=
aHR0cDovL2FwaS50ZW5rd2l6YXJkLmNvbS9maWxpbmcueG1sP2lwYWdlPTExNTQ4OTQxJkRTRVE9M
CZTRVE9MCZTUURFU0M9U0VDVElPTl9FTlRJUkUmc3Vic2lkPTU3 (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
71
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to Purdue in January 2018. 76 Daniels, the President of Purdue University, has
been consistent in sharing Purdue’s number one reason for acquiring Kaplan
University: to fulfill the university’s land-grant mission to offer opportunities
for higher education to as many people as possible. 77 His second reason is that
Purdue was far behind similar universities in providing online learning, but
acquiring an entirely developed and operational online school has allowed
Purdue to catch up in one move. 78 Daniels further defends the deal by stating
that financially, this is a low-risk deal for Purdue. 79 Additionally, he
acknowledges in the open letter that many critics fear this deal will diminish
Purdue’s reputation; however, Daniels is confident this will not be an issue as
this argument was raised by critics over online education programs at Penn State
and University of Maryland, and these schools still enjoy respectable
reputations. 80
One reason people outside of Purdue believe Purdue was especially eager to
take this deal is the fact that the university’s funding has basically flatlined for
several years partially due to a freeze on tuition, causing “considerable financial
constraints.” 81 Under these conditions, a new stream of revenue at a minimum
of $10 million per year looks appealing. 82
B. Benefit For Kaplan
There appear to be many benefits Kaplan Higher Education will receive for
the sale of Kaplan University that go beyond the 12.5% cut of the profits. In this
deal, Kaplan gains use of the “Purdue” brand, new corporate structure, and use
of prospective student information. Kaplan also gains more freedom as it is no
longer subject to gainful employment regulation or the 90/10 rule.
The for-profit education sector has recently seen decreasing enrollment and
increasing criticism, and this deal allows for a lucrative exit strategy from this
sector and entrance into a more stable area. 83
This deal is especially beneficial for Kaplan because they are acquiring

76
Annual Open Letter to the People of Purdue from Mitch Daniels, PURDUE UNIVERSITY (Jan. 2018),
https://www.purdue.edu/president/email/2018/1801-med-openletter-full.html.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Seltzer, supra note 41.
82
Id.
83
Blumenstyk, supra note 38.

MILLS_7.25.19

2019]

7/25/2019 11:42 AM

PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

1101

something invaluable: Purdue’s brand. 84 The ability to advertise and market
using the Purdue name is much more attractive to students than the Kaplan name.
While some critics including Purdue professors worry the use of the name will
water down the Purdue brand, this is not a concern for Kaplan, as Kaplan’s
acquisition of the Purdue brand is a huge benefit even if there is a long term
“watering down” of the Purdue brand. 85
The details of the transition of corporate structure to a benefit corporation
have been discussed above as to its terms, but this change of structure has great
benefit to Kaplan in particular. The first major benefit to Kaplan is that the
operations of the school remain largely unchanged despite the change in
structure. 86 This means that practices used when the school was profit driven are
still in place despite Purdue University’s label as a non-profit public school.
While that may be of concern to others, this makes the transition from Kaplan
University to Purdue Global virtually seamless for Kaplan and its employees.
Second, Purdue Global being dubbed a public school by the state of Indiana is a
“huge marketing benefit.” 87 The ability to market the school as a public
institution engenders trust in prospective students and gives Purdue Global a
new advertising advantage over online for-profit schools. 88
The value of this deal is enhanced for Kaplan by the contract’s lack of
limitations placed on Kaplan for use of prospective student information. 89 The
deal does not set out limitations on Kaplan’s use of student information in
marketing outside of Purdue Global, which allows for the possibility for Kaplan
to utilize these contacts for future marketing of other colleges Kaplan may enter
a deal with, or schools purchased by Kaplan. 90 This is a notable benefit for
Kaplan because what is essentially a perk of this deal is generally a very
expensive transaction. 91 For example, UC Berkeley agreed to give prospective
student information to an online program manager for $4.2 million over 14
years. 92
Kaplan is no longer subject to the gainful employment regulation due to its
84

Id.
Dave Bangert, Questions start for Purdue’s Kaplan deal, JOURNAL & COURIER (Apr. 28, 2017, 7:59
AM),
https://www.jconline.com/story/opinion/columnists/dave-bangert/2017/04/28/bangert-questions-startpurdues-kaplan-deal/100982444/.
86
Blumenstyk, supra note 38.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Shireman, supra note 18.
90
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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change in status from a for-profit to a non-profit public institution. This
regulation monitors employment rates out of certain programs depending on if
the institution is for-profit or non-profit:
Generally, in order to be eligible for funding under the Higher
Education Act Title IV student assistance programs, an educational
program must lead to a degree at a non-profit or public institution or it
must prepare students for “gainful employment in a recognized
occupation.” Therefore, with very few exceptions, any non-degree
program offered by non-profit or public institutions and all educational
programs offered at for-profit institutions must lead to gainful
employment. 93

Kaplan has discontinued its non-degree programs; all programs are now
degree programs within a non-profit institution and therefore now fall outside of
the gainful employment rule set out by the Department of Education. 94
Another rule Kaplan is no longer subject to is known as the “90/10 rule”
which states that any for-profit or proprietary school must derive no more than
90% of its revenue from Title IV, therefore at least 10% of revenue must come
from other sources. 95 As Purdue Global is considered a public non-profit school,
there are now no limitations as to how much revenue may come through Title
IV. 96 There is also a rule which requires that any for-profit school that converts
to a non-profit must report its compliance with the 90/10 test after the conversion
for one year. 97
IV. THE FORM: PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION
Part of what makes Purdue Global unique is its structure as a public benefit
corporation. There are only a handful of educational institutions that are
organized as public benefit corporations and of those few, Purdue Global is the
sole institution claiming to be public. It is important to analyze if this innovative
form is capable of supporting Purdue Global as well as understand if the
corporate form itself is problematic or if Purdue Global’s use of the form is the
problem. First, the history of the public benefit corporation is explained,
followed by an explanation and interpretation of the Indiana public benefit
93
Gainful Employment Information, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/datacenter/school/ge.
94
Fain, supra note 3.
95
34 C.F.R.§ 668.28(a)(1).
96
Fain, supra note 3.
97
FEDERAL STUDENT AID, https://ifap.ed.gov/fsahandbook/1718FSAHbkVol2.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2019).
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corporation statute. Using general history of the corporate form and Indiana’s
interpretation, this section will compare Purdue Global’s utilization of the form
with American College of Education, a public benefit corporation, and with
Delaware’s parallel statute. While form of Purdue Global as a benefit
corporation may appear to show good will by its executives, this form has done
little to change the for-profit ways of Kaplan and may simply create different
problems rather than solving them.
The public benefit corporate form has become popular in state corporate law
over the past twenty years; thirty-three states, including Indiana, have passed
legislation allowing it. 98 This corporate form legally requires the entity to pursue
not only profits, but a social mission as well. 99 Benefit corporations are being
utilized as an alternative to the traditional corporate form rather than as an
alternative to nonprofit status, as evidenced by the underrepresentation of benefit
corporations in sectors where non-profit organizations have a strong presence,
overrepresentation in agricultural crop production, and gaining popularity of forprofit educational institutions transitioning to the benefit corporate model. 100
There are six known formerly for-profit educational institutions which have
recently made the switch to the benefit corporation model including Purdue
Global. The ability to advertise as a public benefit corporation may serve as a
means for market differentiation, or viewed through a more sinister lens, “for
schools that engage in exploitative practices, deceptive corporate branding…[it]
makes the university seem altruistic and trustworthy.” 101
Two major issues with benefit corporations at large is the lack of oversight
and the low bar to claiming benefit corporation status. 102 If states have a low bar
to become a benefit corporation, it is argued the form will be overly adopted,
and therefore lose its intended purpose as a marker of genuine social
enterprise. 103 The laws of benefit corporation are written to ensure
accountability of proper use of the form by requiring an annual benefit report,
but this provision is mostly ignored. 104
It is important to differentiate a benefit corporation from a B Corp

98
Ellen Berrey, Comment, Social Enterprise Law in Action: Organizational Characteristics of U.S.
Benefit Corporations, 20 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW 21, 68-71 (Fall 2018).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 68-71.
101
Id. at 70-71.
102
Id. at 100.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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certification. A ‘benefit corporation’ refers to a corporate structure created by
the state which allows a corporation to have a dual mission of creating profit and
fulfilling a social mission whereas a B Corp certification is an accreditation
given to a company that is not necessarily a benefit corporation, or even a
corporation. 105 The B Corp certification is awarded by several organizations, the
most prominent being B Lab, which sets a rigorous standard for businesses to
pass, but the only legal requirement of this certification is to “amend their legal
governing documents to require their board of directors to balance profit and
purpose.” 106 If a public benefit corporation, or any business form, is a B Corp,
it has good reasons for publicizing its certification as B Corps status is wellbranded and has an identifiable logo. 107
A. Indiana’s Benefit Corporation Laws
The Indiana legislature enacted law allowing creation of benefit corporations
that became effective January 1, 2016. 108 Benefit corporations are defined as
corporations that have a ‘general public benefit’ as part of its purpose. A
“general public benefit” is defined as “a material positive impact on society and
the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from
the business and operations of a benefit corporation.” 109
The initial steps to form a benefit corporation are akin to traditional method
of incorporation including filing articles of incorporation, drafting by-laws in
accordance with the Indiana Code, and establishing corporate tax structure. 110
Additional steps that are required to operate as a benefit corporation in
Indiana include: electing the benefit director, preparing annual benefit reports
on the public benefits the company has had, distributing report to the
shareholders, and posting the report on the corporation’s web site. 111 The
corporation may choose to elect a benefit officer, but it is not required. 112 The
benefit report must include an “assessment of the overall social and
105

Id. at 84-85.
About B Corps, B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/about-b-corps (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
107
Id.
108
Sarah Studzinski, A Look at The Benefit Corporation, INSIDE INDIANA BUSINESS http://www.
insideindianabusiness.com/story/29862051/a-look-at-the-benefit-corporation (Aug.(Aug. 23, 2015, 11:58 PM),
http://www.insideindianabusiness.com/story/29862051/a-look-at-the-benefit-corporation.
109
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-2-7 (LexisNexis 2016).
110
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-3-1; (LexisNexis 2016); Indiana Benefit Corporations: The What, How and
Whether of Forming a B-Corp., BLOOMING LAW, https://www.bloominglaw.com/blog/2017/9/21/indianabenefit-corporations-the-what-how-and-whether-of-forming-a-b-corp (last visited Feb 21, 2019).
111
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-6-1 (LexisNexis 2016).
112
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-8-1 (LexisNexis 2016).
106
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environmental performance of the benefit corporation against a third party
standard.” 113 This third-party standard may be the B Lab’s B Corp certification
standard, or some other standard which complies with the definition as described
in section 13. 114 It is also worth noting that Purdue Global is not currently a
certified B Corp, it is only incorporated under the benefit corporation structure.
This may be due to the newness of Purdue Global and could gain the certification
given more time.
The Indiana benefit corporation statute creates a right of action, called a
“benefit enforcement proceeding” which is standard in other benefit corporation
statutes as well. 115 This proceeding is an action against a benefit corporation, its
directors, or its officers for either a “failure to pursue or create…general public
benefit or a specific public benefit” or a “violation of an obligation, duty, or
standard of conduct under this article.” 116 A benefit enforcement proceeding can
be commenced or maintained by only the corporation or derivatively by a
director or shareholders holding a certain percent of stock. 117 Since this right is
given to such a discrete group, the scope of potential future enforcement
proceedings is minimized. 118 Purdue Global is a benefit corporation that is
controlled by its sole member, the Trustees of Purdue University. 119 Therefore,
if Purdue Global fails to pursue a general public benefit, only the corporation
itself or the Trustees of Purdue University have the right to bring this claim.
Since the law’s enactment in 2016, there has not been a benefit enforcement
proceeding case in an Indiana state court. In fact, there is no record of any benefit
enforcement proceeding being brought against any corporation in any state.
Benefit corporation laws acquired popularity in 2009 and gained momentum in
2011, but despite this right of action being in place for eight to ten years in some
states, not one enforcement proceeding has been filed. 120 This may be an
example of ineffective oversight of the benefit corporate form because this right
of action is the only way to properly bring a case if a benefit corporation is not

113

IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3- 10-1 (LexisNexis 2016).
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-2-13 (LexisNexis 2016).
115
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-9-1 (LexisNexis 2016).
116
Id.
117
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-9-3 (LexisNexis 2016).
118
Eric Camm, Benefit Enforcement Proceedings for the Benefit Corporation – What are they and How
will they work?, APEX LAW GROUP, (Apr. 2, 2012), (Apr. http://apexlg.com/benefit-enforcement-proceedingsfor-the-benefit-corporation-what-are-they-and-how-will-they-work/.
119
Ownership, PURDUE GLOBAL, https://catalog.purdueglobal.edu/contact-information/ownership/ (last
visited Apr. 9, 2019).
120
Idaho Code § 30-2011 (2015); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14A:18-10 (2013); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-790 (2011);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A § 21.09 (2011).
114
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adhering to its stated purpose. With such a narrow right of action, oversight of
benefit corporations in the court will be limited or absent. Other avenues of
oversight will need to be utilized to ensure benefit corporations are adhering to
their stated purpose.
The transaction of Purdue Global acquiring Kaplan University was official
as of March 22, 2018 and Purdue Global Articles of Incorporation are amended
through February 13, 2018 so Purdue University is just approaching its first full
year of incorporation. 121 According to the Indiana Code, the annual benefit
report shall be sent to each shareholder on the earlier of 120 days following the
end of the fiscal year of the benefit corporation or the same date that the benefit
corporation delivers any other annual report to shareholders. 122 There is no
mention of deadlines for when the annual benefit report must be posted on the
corporation’s website. 123 After the initial secrecy of the deal, Purdue University
has published frequent updates on Purdue Global including the progress of the
acquisition, announcing the new chancellor, terms of the deal, and benefits new
students may receive. 124 However, there is no mention of a benefit director or
benefit report in these press releases, nor are they mentioned anywhere on the
Purdue Global website, bylaws, or articles of incorporation.
B. Comparison of Purdue Global with American College of Education
There are currently four former for-profit schools that are now benefit
corporations, as previously mentioned. 125 These schools are American College
of Education, Rasmussen College, Walden University, and Purdue Global. 126
American College of Education (ACE) is incorporated in Indiana and became a
benefit corporation in 2016. 127 Since it is also in Indiana, ACE is granted

121
Transaction Complete for Purdue Global, PURDUE UNIVERSITY (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2018/Q1/transaction-complete-for-purdue-global.html; Amended
and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Purdue University Global, Inc., PURDUE GLOBAL,
,https://www.purdueglobal.edu/faculty/articles-of-incorporation-pg-may-2018.pdf, (last visited Apr. 9, 2019);
See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-10-4 (LexisNexis 2016).
122
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-10-4. (LexisNexis 2016).
123
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-10-5. (LexisNexis 2016).
124
Annual Open Letter to the People of Purdue from Mitch Daniels, PURDUE UNIVERSITY (Jan. 2018),
https://www.purdue.edu/president/email/2018/1801-med-openletter-full.html; See Purdue announces name for
new public university, PURDUE UNIVERSITY (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/
2018/Q1/purdue-announces-name-for-new-public-university-purdue-university-global-to-serve-workingadults,-online.html.
125
Berrey, supra note 98 at 70-71.
126
Id. at 68-71.
127
Jaleesa Jones, Year in Review: ACE’s First Year as a B Corp, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF EDUCATION
(Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.ace.edu/resources/news/newsitem/year-in-review-ace-first-year-as-a-b-corp.
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accreditation by the Higher Learning Commission, the same accreditor as
Purdue Global. 128
American College of Education advertises that it is the first and only
company in Indiana that is both incorporated as a benefit corporation and is also
a certified B corp. 129 ACE incorporated in fall of 2016 and claimed B Corp
accreditation in December 2017, which is a fast turnaround as gaining B Corp
accreditation is rigorous. 130
Purdue Global makes no indications on their website regarding who serves
as the benefit director or officer; however, ACE’s publications identify a B
Corps benefits officer. 131 KK Byland is identified as the “B Corps benefit
officer” so this role originates from B Corp certification and not from the Indiana
benefit corporation statute that states a benefit officer may be selected. 132 Purdue
is not a B Corp so it is not directly comparable, but nonetheless ACE identifying
the benefits officer allows for greater transparency by notifying the public and
ACE students what individual is responsible for maintaining the social benefit
goals of the company.
ACE is subject to releasing benefit reports once a year as a benefit
corporation under Indiana law, and this report must be posted on the company
website. 133 While it is too early to know how Purdue Global will deal with this
requirement, ACE has been a benefit corporation for over three full years but
there is no sign of the yearly benefit reports anywhere on ACE’s website. The
only recourse for the failure to adhere to Indiana law is a benefit enforcement
proceeding brought by a stockholder or director of the company. 134 There is no
indication any action has been taken, and there likely will not be action taken.
Derivative suits are not initiated often, and stockholders in this instance are
probably not seeing decreased stock values due to the lack of publicizing a
yearly report, and therefore have no incentive to bring suit.
American College of Education’s website states the ownership of the school
which Purdue Global posted as well. According to its website, ACE is a “wholly

128
Statement of Accreditation, HIGHER LEARNING COMMISSION, https://www.hlcommission.org/
component/directory/?Action=ShowBasic&Itemid=&instid=1067 (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
129
Jones, supra note 127.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Leadership, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, https://www.ace.edu/about/leadership (last visited
Apr. 9, 2019).
133
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-10-5 (LexisNexis 2016).
134
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1.3-9-1. (LexisNexis 2016).

MILLS_7.25.19

1108

7/25/2019 11:42 AM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 6

owned subsidiary” of ACE Holdco PBC. 135 No further information about ACE
Holdco PBC can be found online. If this is in fact the business structure, ACE’s
current position is akin to Kaplan University before it was sold to Purdue. In
other words, ACE’s current corporate structure resembles a for-profit college
model.
American College of Education has been making headlines but not for the
same reasons as Purdue Global. ACE has been ranked as one of the best places
to work in Indiana for three years. 136 ACE has seemingly not received any public
criticism despite transitioning from for-profit to benefit corporation in the same
state as Purdue Global. This suggests it is not the benefit corporate model or
non-profit claims alone that are bothering critics, but rather Purdue Global stands
out for its claim to be a public school.
Overall, neither of these two benefit corporations are completely adhering to
the Indiana benefit corporation law and there does not seem to be public concern
over the disregard for the law.
C. Comparison of Purdue Global with Delaware Benefit Corporation School
Comparing Purdue Global to a higher education public benefit corporation
in another state will show if there are similarities in how the schools follow the
corporate structure and if there are differences in the state laws that affect the
schools. Rasmussen College was a for-profit school that transitioned to a benefit
corporation in January 2014 and incorporated in Delaware, making it the first of
the four for-profit schools that became benefit corporations.
Rasmussen College was similarly situated to Kaplan University in 2010 as
it was also identified in the Senate report as having predatory practices and low
graduation rates. 137 Another similarity between Rasmussen and now Purdue
Global is that they are both accredited by the Higher Learning Commission. 138

135
Administrative
Office
and
Ownership,
AMERICAN
COLLEGE
OF
EDUCATION,
http://ace.catalog.acalog.com/content.php?catoid=17&navoid=1076&hl=ownership&returnto=search
(last
visited Apr. 9, 2019).
136
Michael Cook, American College of Education Makes Third Straight Appearance on List of Indiana
Best Places to Work, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.ace.edu/resources/news/
newsitem/american-college-of-education-makes-third-straight-appearance-on-list-of-indiana-best-places-towork.
137
MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR AND PENSIONS, 112TH CONG., FOR PROFIT
HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS
19 (Comm. Print 2012)), https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI.pdf.
138
Mark Keierleber, For-Profit College Becomes a ‘Public Benefit Corporation,’ THE CHRONICLE (Jan.
23, 2014), https://www.chronicle.com/article/For-Profit-College-Becomes-a/144149.
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Unlike Purdue Global, Rasmussen College does not advertise to students on
its website that it is a public benefit corporation. The Rasmussen website only
says at the very bottom of the page in small font that this is a public benefit
corporation, therefore Rasmussen is not using the change in structure as a
differentiator in the market as proponents suggested it would. 139
Delaware public benefit corporation law states that at least once every other
year the corporation must “provide its stockholders with a statement as to the
corporation’s promotion of the public benefit or public benefits identified in the
certificate of incorporation and of the best interest of those materially affected
by the corporation’s conduct.” This Delaware provision is distinguished from
Indiana’s benefit corporation law because it only requires the benefit report to
be released once every two years rather than every year, as the Indiana law
mandates. 140 A second distinction is that Delaware law does not require benefit
corporations to publish the benefit report on their website, but rather states the
corporation “may” be made publish if so provided in the bylaws or articles of
incorporation. 141 Unlike Purdue Global, Rasmussen has not posted their bylaws
and articles of incorporation on their website so it is unknown if either mandates
the posting of the benefit report. Since the requirement is to share the report
every other year, Rasmussen should have two or three reports by this point but
none are available online. The unavailability of benefit reports is consistent
across Rasmussen, Purdue Global, and American College of Education.
V. THE SUBSTANCE: ISSUES FROM THE DEAL AND KAPLAN
UNIVERSITY’S BAGGAGE
While it is known what problems Kaplan University had as a for-profit
institution, it is still too early to know what issues associated with for-profit
education will carry on in Purdue Global. However due to vocal opponents and
the release of the Higher Learning Commission report, some possible issues of
Purdue Global have been identified. The issues that have been raised are student
and faculty rights, mixed signals from Purdue Global to the public, and having
two boards of trustees.
A. Faculty and Student Rights
The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) obtained a

139
140
141

Berrey, supra note 98 at 70-71.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 366 (2013).
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copy and reported on a nondisclosure agreement that was intended for Purdue
Global employees and faculty to sign as a term of employment. 142 An AAUP
director Greg Scholtz called this agreement “breathtakingly inappropriate in
higher education” and stated he has “never seen anything like it.” 143 The
“Confidentiality and Restriction Agreement” restricts faculty’s ownership of
their material and limits academic freedom.
The agreement restricts faculty ownership of work material by having the
employee agree that work product, including course material, created by faculty
will be considered work-for-hire and therefore Purdue Global property. 144
Scholtz asserts this agreement is contrary to standard academic practice and
would be unprecedented for a public non-profit university. 145 This agreement
also limits the faculty’s academic freedom and communication by forbidding the
faculty from disclosing any “trade secret” information. Such information
includes the school’s materials, teaching methods, finances, expenses, practices,
and policies “to anyone who is not specifically authorized to receive it.” 146 This
can include other Purdue Global employees. This limitation on faculty to openly
discuss school matters with other faculty members and employees goes against
academic freedom that is standard at public institutions. 147 Under this
agreement, Purdue Global faculty would not have the liberty to speak out
publicly or even within the school on common issues such as budget or academic
policies. 148
Once this nondisclosure agreement became public, higher education groups
condemned the practice and Purdue Global stopped requiring non-disclosure
agreements in September 2018. 149 Betty Vandenbosch, Chancellor of Purdue
Global, stated in a letter to faculty that a committee had already been reviewing
the agreement even before the media reports. 150 Vandenbosch also stated in the
letter than this policy was a 10-year-old policy that was used at Kaplan

142
Purdue Global Nondisclosure Agreement Runs Roughshod Over Faculty Rights, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.aaup.org/media-release/purdue-globalnondisclosure-agreement-runs-roughshod-over-faculty-rights#.XGxvwZNKjUq.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Jeffrey R. Young, Purdue Global Drops Requirement That Professors Sign Nondisclosure Agreements,
EDSURGE (Sep. 6, 2018), https://www.edsurge.com/news/2018-09-06-purdue-global-drops-requirement-thatprofessors-sign-non-disclosure-agreements.
150
Id.
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University. 151
The second source of concern regarding faculty and student rights at Purdue
Global comes from a policy guide within the original 2017 contract between
Purdue University and Kaplan. 152 This was obtained through a public records
request to the Department of Education for Purdue University records. 153 This
contract was completed before the creation of Purdue Global and therefore not
under its shield from public disclosure exceptions. 154 There seem to be no other
versions of the contract available to the public, so it is unknown exactly what
changed from this to any later versions, or even if there were later versions. This
policy guide showed that Purdue agreed to make Purdue Global students agree
to forced arbitration, maintain high spending on marketing and recruiting, keep
admissions standards currently used by Kaplan, and keep tuition from
decreasing. 155
Forced arbitration for students is a common practice in for-profit schools and
is apparently carrying over to the public Purdue Global. 156 A copy of the
“Arbitration Agreement and Waiver of Jury Trial” document is available online
and is current through 2018. 157 This agreement is supposed to be signed by
students as part of the enrollment process, and this is concerning because such
forced arbitration agreements are “virtually non-existent” at public schools. 158
Another concerning provision in the policy guide was the agreement to keep
spending high for marketing and recruiting. This is apparently highly important
to Kaplan because the policy guide states that Purdue may be subject to penalty
fees if the Purdue Global budget does not allocate enough money to outreach,
media, and admissions to meet the “target outreach and admissions spend.” 159
Similarly inflexible are the low admissions standards which Purdue has agreed
to keep. 160 If Purdue wants to increase the difficulty for standards of admission,

151
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Robert Shireman, Purdue University Global Is a For-Profit College Masquerading as a Public
University, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION (Aug. 28, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/purdue-universityglobal-profit-college-masquerading-public-university/?agreed=1.
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Purdue University Global, Arbitration Agreement and Waiver of Jury Trial, https://productiontcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2018/08/28094632/Arbitration-pages-from-Purdue-Global-enrollment-agreementgenerated-July-2-2018.pdf.
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Kaplan maintains a right to veto that decision. 161
The final issue in the policy guide that could negatively impact students is
an agreement to keep tuition from decreasing. 162 If Purdue Global chooses to
lower tuition, somehow over the veto of Kaplan, Purdue could be responsible to
Kaplan for revenue lost. 163 However if tuition is raised, there are no penalties
against anyone. 164 President Mitch Daniels hails Purdue Global as an
opportunity to provide widespread affordable and accessible education,
however, with an agreement to keep tuition from ever decreasing, this seems to
cut against that mission.
B. Mixed Signals from Purdue Global to Prospective Students
After a campus visit but before the release of Higher Learning Commission’s
final decision for Purdue Global accreditation status, Robert Rucker of HLC sent
President Daniels a report voicing concerns about the deal. 165 A major concern
involved how Purdue was planning to keep Purdue Global separate from the
main University in the minds of prospective students. The report stated that
Purdue Global “must be clear and consistent in its messaging, especially as it
pertains to the status (Kaplan University) students will have as Purdue
students…Purdue must create a clear, articulate communication and marketing
plan stating a consistent message as to the relationship and the autonomy of each
campus and its respective ethos.” 166 A webpage from Purdue Global’s website
is shown below. The photograph of Purdue University campus behind Purdue
Global’s webpage could not be more flagrantly disregarding the HLC’s

161
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Id.
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Dave Bangert, Lingering questions on Purdue-Kaplan deal, regulators’ records reveal, JOURNAL &
COURIER (Feb. 22, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://www.jconline.com/story/opinion/columnists/dave-bangert/2018/02/
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recommendation.

C. Two Boards of Trustees
The report from the Higher Learning Commission expressed concern
regarding two separate boards of trustees and which board had ultimate authority
in which situations. 167 The report specifically questioned why the regional
campuses report to President Daniels and the Purdue Board of Trustees, but
Purdue Global is afforded its own board comprised of Purdue and Kaplan
trustees. 168 Neither Purdue nor Purdue Global offered a clear rationale for the
two board or what differentiates them to the HLC. 169
The chairman of the Board of Trustees of Purdue University, Michael R.
Berghoff, is also the chairman of the Board of Trustees of Purdue Global. 170 The
Higher Learning Commission did not make note of this specifically in their
report, however, it is an interesting point to note. There is no explanation for
why the chairman is the same on both boards and it adds to the confusion HLC
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voiced regarding why a separate board is warranted if the governance of both
schools is the same.
D. Kaplan University’s Troubled Past
Questionable practices by for-profit schools led to scrutiny, which began
being seriously covered by the media in 2009 and 2010. 171 Regulators took
notice as well, and began cracking down on the industry’s wrongdoings. 172 By
2010, Kaplan University had been riddled with dishonest practices publicly
exposed by a probing Senate committee report. 173 This report from the Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee implicated Kaplan University by
name, repeatedly. 174
E. The Senate Report
In 2012, the Senate released a thorough report “For Profit Higher Education:
The Failure to Safeguard the Federal Investment and Ensure Student Success”
after an oversight investigation of for-profit institutions was initiated in 2010. 175
While the findings of this report were far-reaching, for the purposes of this
paper, only the statistics relevant to Kaplan University’s performance will be
discussed. This Senate report is being used to illustrate Kaplan’s history before
becoming Purdue Global because it includes data and information collected by
an impartial fact-finding body. This information is intended to paint a picture of
Kaplan University’s practices as well as public appearance in 2012. This report
studied fifteen publicly traded companies which included Kaplan, Inc. 176
The report found that for-profit schools, including Kaplan, charged
significantly higher tuition prices for an associate degree than community
colleges offering comparable two-year degree programs. 177 Kaplan’s tuition for
an Associate in Business Administration is $30,065 whereas community
colleges average published tuition is $5,926 for a two-year degree. 178
A Kaplan manual stated that the main focus of the recruiter position is the
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recruiter’s sales. 179 Recruitment managers created a work environment in which
the highest priority was reaching an enrollment quota, which was made clear in
a Kaplan recruiter manual which “instructed recruiting managers to clearly
‘establish expectations’ with new recruiters that the enrollment numbers mean
everything.” 180
The committee found sales tactics to be aggressive and targeted towards
vulnerable populations, which included visiting social service agencies. 181 An
internal Kaplan email revealed that a recruiter targeted vulnerable groups by
leaving their business cards at “an office for section 8 [public housing].” 182 The
recruiters were also aggressive. 183 In Kaplan training manuals, recruiters were
given directions to “KEEP DIGGING UNTIL YOU UNCOVER THEIR PAIN,
FEARS, AND DREAMS. . . . IF YOU GET THE PROSPECT TO THINK
ABOUT HOW TOUGH THEIR SITUATION IS RIGHT NOW AND IF THEY
DISCUSS THE LIFE THEY CAN’T GIVE THEIR FAMILY BECAUSE
THEY DON’T HAVE A DEGREE, YOU WILL DRAMATICALLY
INCREASE YOUR CHANCES OF GAINING A COMMITMENT FROM
THE STUDENT! IF YOU CAN STIR UP THEIR EMOTIONS, YOU WILL
CREATE URGENCY!” [emphasis in original]. 184
The committee studied the data of the top 10 worst companies for student
retention for associates and bachelors degree programs. Kaplan was in the top
10 of both degree categories, and the worst performer under bachelor’s degrees
with a dropout rate of 68%. 185 For associates degree programs, Kaplan’s dropout
rate was 69%, the third highest rate in the category. 186
Companies estimate the percentage of the amounts they lend to students on
which they believe students will default. Kaplan expects up to 80% of its
institutional loans will default. 187 This rate is by far the highest rate out of the
eight companies measured, with the second highest being 55%. 188 The
committee asserted that “these loans underscore the for-profit colleges’
knowledge and expectation that a majority of students will not succeed in
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obtaining the employment and financial security necessary to avoid default.” 189
In the 18 months following the report, some of these schools, including
Kaplan, introduced orientation programs to help students understand what
programs and payment plans are viable for them and to decrease the dropout rate
of students. 190 These programs “appear to be having a beneficial impact on the
likelihood of success for students enrolling in those schools.” 191 While the
committee found Kaplan’s practices to be abysmal, overall the company was
enacting “the most significant reforms of any company examined.” 192
VI. THE FUTURE FOR FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS AND PURDUE GLOBAL
For-profit schools saw their peak enrollment in 2010, and over the next six
years enrollment at for-profit private institutions decreased by 47 percent. 193
During this same period, public university enrollment decreased by 4 percent
and private non-profit university enrollment increased by 6 percent. 194 Despite
the Trump administration instituting policies that are friendly to for-profit
schools, companies are still leaving the sector.
This continued exit may be due to the public scrutiny under the Obama
administration, the country’s solid economy rates driving adults into the
workforce rather than back to school, or public institutions’ improving online
offerings. 195 However, this supposed exiting of the for-profit market could be
viewed as more of a shift than an exit. Fifteen for-profit schools have
transitioned or are in the process of transitioning to a non-profit model. 196 Some
of these new non-profit schools seem to be holding on to for-profit habits, such
as paying board members handsomely, contracting with companies owned by
executives, and creating ways to increase profits. 197 These schools that are
claiming to be non-profit without instituting proper financial controls may able
to continue operating undetected by the IRS due to dysfunction and lack of
189
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funding that are necessary to monitor them. 198
A. Potential Changes and Their Impact on Purdue Global
On July 26, 2018 Rep. Bobby Scott, a ranking member on the House
Committee on Education and the Workforce, introduced the Aim Higher Act,
which is a reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. 199 This proposed
legislation includes provisions to narrow the definition of nonprofit and public
institutions of higher education as well as provisions to improve the standards
used to analyze school conversions to non-profit status. Purdue Global and
Purdue President Mitch Daniels are steadfast in defining Purdue global as a
public university, and the Articles of Incorporation state the corporation will
adhere to the Indiana Nonprofit Corporation Act; therefore, a change to these
definitions could impact this designation. 200
The proposed bill defines a ‘public institution of higher education’ as an
institution
(A) for which all obligations of the institution are valid and
binding obligations of the State (or of an equivalent governmental
entity); and
(B) for which the full faith and credit of such State (or equivalent
government entity) is pledged for the timely payment of such
obligations. 201

Purdue Global does not accept state funding and therefore is not backed by
the full faith and credit of the state of Indiana. 202 If this provision passes as it is
currently written, Purdue Global may face further scrutiny and challenges for
defining itself as a public institution.
The bill proposes a new definition for ‘nonprofit institution of higher
education’ as an institution which

198
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(Apr. 3, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/conversions-of-for-profit-to-nonprofit-collegesdeserve-regulators-scrutiny-1b9174cf534d; Shireman, supra note 196.
199
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(A) is a nonprofit, as defined in section 103(13); and
(B) at which no member of the governing board of the nonprofit
institution of higher education (other than ex officio members serving
at the pleasure of the remainder of the governing board and receiving
a fixed salary), or any person with the power to appoint or remove
members of such governing board, receives any substantial direct or
indirect economic benefit (including a lease, promissory note, or other
contract) from the nonprofit institution of higher education.203

Purdue Global likely falls within the parameters of a nonprofit as defined in
section 103(13) but it is harder to know if part (B) will impact Purdue Global
because the payment structures are not available to the public. One possible issue
with part (B) is that there is one member of the Board of Trustees that is from
Kaplan, Inc. and this board member might be paid through Kaplan, Inc. which
is paid for its services for Purdue Global. 204 Such a payment method would be
against this proposed definition.
In addition to these changes in definitions, the Aim Higher Act proposes to
add a provision on for-profit conversions. The provision would grant the
Secretary of Education power to decide if a for-profit can become a nonprofit
institution of higher education. The institution must submit an application to the
Secretary that shows
(1) that such institution is a nonprofit institution of higher
education, as defined in section 103(25);
(2) subject to subsection (d), that the institution has not acquired
any other institution of higher education (as defined in section 102), or
a significant portion of the assets of such other institution, for more
than the value of such other institution or such assets, respectively; and
(3) in the case of an institution that has been acquired by another
party, that such institution is not controlled by such party. 205

These terms seem to leave lots of room for discretion for the secretary as the
language is very broad. If the Act is passed, Purdue Global may face problems
fulfilling requirement #3. Kaplan University is the educational institution which
has been acquired by Purdue University, and the question is if Purdue University
controls the institution. The Board of Trustees for Purdue Global is composed
almost entirely of Purdue University trustees; however, Kaplan still retains
power to veto some decisions by Purdue Global. This split of governance power
between Kaplan, Inc. and Purdue University may be enough to fulfill
203
204
205
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requirement #3. These three proposed requirements seem to recognize a deal
structure that is becoming commonplace in for-profit transitions. The deal
structure is as follows: The for-profit school’s owner or parent company either
a) converts the school to non-profit status, or b) transfers the school to a nonprofit the owner created. Then, the new non-profit school contracts with the
owner or parent company to provide all of its services. So, while the school may
be non-profit, they are locked in a deal with a parent for-profit company. For
example, Ashford University is attempting to contract with its for-profit parent
company, Bridgepoint, to pay it 60 to 65 percent of tuition revenues for its
services. 206 Other companies attempting to utilize this model include Grand
Canyon Education, Herzing University, and Remington Colleges. 207
CONCLUSION
Purdue Global is a novel creation that is too new to be considered either a
success or a failure.However, there are many aspects of Purdue Global and its
relation to Purdue University which are troubling even at this stage. In this
transaction between a public university and a for-profit company, both parties
had to cede some things in order to make the deal agreeable. This give and take
resulted in Purdue Global having neither the full support of a public university,
nor the regulation required of a private for-profit entity, and therefore became a
diluted version of both. The school is considered public, but it does not offer the
same protection or advocacy for students. The school is still in a long-term deal
with Kaplan, Inc., which has left many of its for-profit practices in place but
without the federal regulation required of a for-profit entity. This trade-off has
created both a lack of oversight and a governance structure which is ambiguous.
At its core, this transaction and creation of Purdue Global as a non-profit
public university is blurring the lines between public and private schools,
resulting in an entity with features of both. The new Indiana law regarding
Purdue Global’s status as a public school and exempting Purdue Global from
public records requirements is one example of how this institution is defined as
public when advantageous yet falls outside the definition of public when it is
not. This contradiction can also be seen in Purdue Global’s label as a public
school to be exempt from the 90-10 Rule and the gainful employment rule, but
not “public” in the same way as Purdue University, because Purdue Global is
not backed by the full faith and credit of the state of Indiana.
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Purdue Global utilizes the public benefit corporate form and it is the first
public, non-profit school to do so. This corporate form has allowed Purdue
Global to operate in ways traditional public schools legally cannot. Purdue
Global has used the corporate form as an advertising tool as well as a way to
maintain the traditional corporate privileges enjoyed before the acquisition.
Purdue Global has advertised their status as a benefit corporation as a way
to differentiate Purdue Global in the higher education market and distance
Kaplan, Inc. from their roots in the publicly traded for-profit industry. It is too
soon to know if this will attract new students beyond those who were already
enrolled in Kaplan University before the acquisition. Purdue Global is at least
hoping that this designation will differentiate it from other schools, because
Purdue Global advertises its status as a public benefit corporation to students.
Beyond advertising, the public benefit corporate form is concerning because it
does not necessarily fix the corporate issues of a for-profit and this form does
not hold Purdue Global accountable.
One way Purdue Global retained regular corporate privileges as a public
benefit corporation was that there was no notable change in governance when
converting from a for-profit corporation. The Purdue Global website contains
the bylaws and the articles of incorporation of the school, which is at least one
aspect of transparency of the school, and it is these very documents that reveal
the lack of adherence to the Indiana benefit corporation laws. The Purdue Global
bylaws do not contain the mandatory information regarding a benefit officer or
a general public benefit. This disregard for the benefit corporation laws shows
Purdue Global operations have remained largely unchanged from when the
school was a for-profit business.
Another troubling aspect of this corporate form is that Purdue Global is not
being held accountable under the public benefit corporation. It is not being held
accountable due to the lack of oversight from the State of Indiana and the Board
itself, and it isn’t accountable to students or individuals through the court. The
Indiana statute outlining how benefit corporations are to be formed and operate
does not create a method for the State to take action if the corporation does not
adhere to the statute, rather the only individuals who may sue the corporation
for not following the Indiana law is members of the corporate board. This is a
principle of traditional corporations, however, this supposedly innovative
corporate form is intended to benefit the public as a co-equal goal with
benefitting the shareholders and the law is not allowing the public to enforce
this. This barrier to bringing a claim plus the forced arbitration agreement
students sign effectively bar any legal action against Purdue Global in court by

MILLS_7.25.19

2019]

7/25/2019 11:42 AM

PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

1121

students or faculty. This lack of ability to bring claims against Purdue Global is
troubling because there is no such barrier to claims in public universities, which
Purdue Global claims to be. The issue of lack of accountability may apply to all
public benefit corporation state statutes because the provisions of the Indiana
statute are very similar to those in Delaware and other states. If a state’s public
benefit corporate law is utilized by a school and is generally unreachable in court
for its corporate choices, this may allow schools across the country to
incorporate under the public benefit form in order to avoid court proceedings
which would otherwise be allowed at public universities.
Finally, the addition in the 2017 Appropriations bill in the Indiana General
Assembly which allowed Purdue Global to operate exactly how its corporate
leaders want to, is a disturbing maneuver that sets a dangerous example for other
states. While it is commonplace for interest groups to draft pieces of suggested
legislation for lawmakers, 208 this is alarmingly different. A piece of legislation
that was specifically tailored to allow a state educational institution to control a
public benefit corporation (which may provide instruction or education online
or in person) as its affiliated postsecondary institution, and to back all the debts
and liabilities of the affiliated institution is much more targeted than an interest
group dropping off suggested legislation on desks across the country. This was
the General Assembly of Indiana creating the foundation necessary for a single
business transaction involving a private party to continue without obstruction.
In conclusion, Purdue Global is a unique creation combining for-profit and
public education that is too new to know if it can be deemed a success. While
there is potential for this new educational institution to further Purdue’s mission,
there are many reasons at present to be concerned. Purdue Global claims it is a
public non-profit school, but many elements of Kaplan University’s for-profit
past remain, which is particularly concerning given Kaplan’s history of
exploiting students. The corporate form has allowed Purdue Global to remain
unaccountable to the communities it purports to serve, the State of Indiana
cleared the path for Purdue to write law in order for the school to exist, and the
transaction itself contained terms which prioritize Kaplan, Inc. over student
experience.
This deal between Purdue University and Kaplan, Inc. may have farreaching impact as it serves as a model for for-profit schools looking for a
208
Rob O’Dell & Nick Penzenstadler, You elected them to write new laws. They’re letting corporations
do it instead., USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2019/04/
03/abortion-gun-laws-stand-your-ground-model-bills-conservatives-liberal-corporate-influencelobbyists/3162173002/.
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lucrative exit strategy from a declining market. This deal undoubtedly benefits
the for-profit school executives and creates a new revenue stream for Purdue
University. These institutions have struck a balance that incorporates elements
of a public university with those of a private for-profit and in the process created
a novel educational opportunity; however, they neglected to consider the central
tenet of higher education when conducting this deal: student welfare.
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